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We present a novel model of corruption dynamics in the form of a nonlinear optimal dynamic control
problem. It has a tipping point, but one whose origins and character are distinct from that in the classic
Schelling (1978) model. The decision maker choosing a level of corruption is the chief or some other kind
of authority ﬁgure who presides over a bureaucracy whose state of corruption is inﬂuenced by the
authority ﬁgure’s actions, and whose state in turn inﬂuences the pay-off for the authority ﬁgure. The pol-
icy interpretation is somewhat more optimistic than in other tipping models, and there are some surpris-
ing implications, notably that reforming the bureaucracy may be of limited value if the bureaucracy takes
its cues from a corrupt leader.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
OR has much to offer concerning complex societal problems
(DeTombe, 2002), including parsimonious representations that
concisely convey key dynamics, which is our objective here. There
is a long tradition of and continuing interest in economic modeling
of corruption (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 2010). A recurrent theme is
endogenous feedback or social interaction creating tipping points
that separate multiple stable equilibria involving lower and higher
levels of corruption. Multiple equilibriummodels are appealing be-
cause they can explain two stylized facts without recourse to semi-
tautological arguments about differences in culture or institutions,
namely, there is (1) great heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the
level of corruption and (2) stability over time in the level of corrup-
tion in any given jurisdiction (Dawid and Feichtinger, 1996; Andvig
and Moene, 1990; Mishra, 2006).
Schelling (1978) offered what is perhaps the most famous such
model, and thereby pioneered the idea of frequency-dependent
equilibria in which individual incentives are a function of the




BY-NC-ND license.example, Blackburn et al. (2006) model how corruption can harm
economic development and low-levels of development can in turn
promote greater corruption, and Mishra (2006) considers how cor-
ruption can develop via an evolutionary game. Lui (1986) uses an
overlapping-generations approach to study the behavior of ofﬁcials
who maximize their expected payoff due to corruption. That paper
considers the implications of multiple equilibria; however, its only
dynamic aspect is young ofﬁcials taking into account the expected
payoff of bribes they might receive when they are old. We take
Schelling’s (1978) model as a point of departure both because it
is so well known and because it was what inspired our thinking.
In particular, we began by asking what a dynamic version of Schel-
ling’s model might look like.
The contribution of this paper is to suggest an alternative mech-
anism generating multiple equilibria, one which has somewhat dif-
ferent policy implications. Schelling’s model considers the
collective action of many small decision makers which feed back
on these decision makers’ private incentives. By marching in lock
step they could shape system behavior. In contrast, we consider
an ‘‘important’’ decision maker whose individual actions alone
are sufﬁcient to have macroeffects. We ﬁnd threshold behavior
and path dependency that looks similar to Schelling’s model in
its ability to explain great heterogeneity in corruption levels across
societies at a given point of time, and persistence over time of both
the lower-and higher-levels of corruption. We do not suggest that
the mechanism described here is in any way better than others or
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several mechanisms can play a role. Rather, we seek only to pro-
vide a concise description of this alternative mechanism.
The next section explains our model. The model takes the form
of a linear-quadratic optimal dynamic control problem, so its qual-
itative solution structure can be derived analytically, as seen in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes with the model’s implications for
a higher-level social planner or reformer who prefers for society
to be in a low-corruption state. The social planner could be a con-
stitutional convention designing the framework for a new system
of government or an altruistic individual or agency that acts to
monitor and respond to institutional corruption. In general, the
present model offers somewhat greater optimism about the poten-
tial for a corrupt society to be pulled back to a low-corruption
state.2. The model
Schelling’s model posits many decision makers who are essen-
tially peers, each of whom rationally makes a binary choice about
whether to be corrupt or not. In our model the masses are not so
strategic; they just emulate norms set by high-level leadership.
Rather, in our model there is just one individual whose decision
calculus is modeled in detail, namely the head or chief executive
of the organization (e.g., the head of state of a country). Further-
more that decision maker’s choice is not binary (be corrupt or
not) but continuous (how aggressively corrupt to be, e.g., how fre-
quently one accepts bribes).
We refer to the decision maker as the ‘‘leader’’ not in a
Stackelberg game theoretic sense but rather just in the ordinary
sense of the word. We refer to the mass of people who take their
cue concerning the acceptability of corruption from the leader as
the ‘‘bureaucracy’’.
The leader can change his/her level of corruption instanta-
neously; it is a control variable, u. In contrast, the culture of corrup-
tion within the bureaucracy has a certain inertia, so it is
represented by the state variable, x. Corruption grows under cor-
rupt leadership and declines under a reformer in a manner we will
describe shortly.
We have in mind incorporating and contrasting two particular
corruption dynamics. The ﬁrst is simply that the leader’s own cor-
rupt acts bring a direct beneﬁt to the leader. The greater the degree
of his or her own corruption, u, the greater is the beneﬁt. This could
be thought of as high-level or grand corruption.
However, the high-level leader does not accept petty bribes
from everyday people directly. Rather, it is bureaucrats who ex-
tract bribes from the citizenry (e.g., to overlook infractions or to
approve building or other licenses). Still, a corrupt leader will ex-
pect the bureaucrats to pass along a proportion of that bribe
money. These payments could be thought of as a ‘‘franchise fee’’
or as ‘‘protection payments’’ purchasing protection from the
enforcement powers vested in the leader’s inner circle and
entourage.
Hence, the leader’s revenue from corruption has two terms, one
that is driven just by u and another that is an increasing function of
both u and the bureaucracy’s total amount of corrupt revenue (pro-
portional to x). The latter has an interaction that makes the cross
partial derivative positive, so the function is not simply additive.
The simplest function that captures this is to assume this 2nd com-
ponent of the leader’s corrupt revenue is proportional to the prod-
uct of u and x.
Both the leader’s own individual corruption and the bureau-
cracy’s corruption are costly for the leader. Participating in corrupt
practices directly (u) is costly because of the risk of being caught.
Parameter b measures the difference between two effects, theleader’s revenue that comes from bribes paid directly to the leader,
not indirectly via the bureaucracy, minus the linear part of the cost
of corruption (e.g., from enforcement risk). In a society whose insti-
tutions make it difﬁcult for the leader to collect payoffs directly,
the parameter b could be negative.
Presiding over a corrupt bureaucracy (x) is costly in terms of
political popularity; the citizenry will blame the political leader if
they are oppressed by pervasive extortion by government ofﬁcials.
Plausibly both costs are convex, and for simplicity we model them
as being quadratic.
In order to avoid the problem of specifying salvage values after
some ﬁnite term of ofﬁce, we abstractly imagine the decision ma-
ker has an inﬁnite time horizon but discounted at some (possibly
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All of the parameters are positive except perhaps b.
The state dynamics should reﬂect the idea that when the leader
demands a large share of the bribe revenue, that will tend to in-
crease corruption in the bureaucracy. This could be so for multiple
reasons, including simple economic necessity (need to take more
bribes to have enough money to pass along), practical factors (cor-
rupt leaders have less incentive and ability to root out corrupt
bureaucrats), and moral/sociological considerations (corrupt lead-
ers signal a culture of permissiveness with respect to corruption).
Conversely, if the leader is honest, the level of bureaucratic corrup-
tion will tend to decline, but not instantaneously. If we let d denote
the rate at which corruption ebbs under a completely honest re-
gime, this suggests the degree of corruption in the bureaucracy
might obey the simple dynamic:
_x ¼ u dx: ð1Þ
As a matter of realism and mathematical convenience, we
presume there is a limit to how corrupt the leader can be, and
scale that upper bound to 1.0. So we impose a control limit
u 6 1.0 which, given the state dynamics, also bounds the state
variable. The control must be non-negative, for exogenous
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_x ¼ u dx;
uP 0;
u 6 1:0;
with x the state and u the control. The current value Hamiltonian is
H ¼ auxþ bu 1
2
u2  Cx G
2
x2 þ kðu dxÞ;
thus the costate equation is
_k ¼ ðr þ dÞk auþ C þ Gx:
The necessary optimality condition for the control if no control con-
straints are active can be determined to be
Hu ¼ axþ b uþ k ¼ 0; ð2Þ
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region
_u ¼ a _xþ _k;
¼ aðu dxÞ þ ðr þ dÞk auþ C þ Gx;
¼ aðu dxÞ þ ðr þ dÞðax bþ uÞ  auþ C þ Gx;
¼ ðr þ dÞu ðr þ 2dÞaxþ Gx ðr þ dÞbþ C:
This gives for the _u ¼ 0-isocline:




r þ d ; ð3Þ
The slope is greater than d, so the _u ¼ 0-isocline is steeper than
the _x ¼ 0-isocline iff
a >
dðr þ dÞ þ G
r þ 2d : ð4Þ
We can ﬁnd that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in state and
control iff a2 < G. As the problem is linear-quadratic, the control
and state space are compact; thus an optimal solution exists. It
can easily be proven that the control is continuous if the costate
is continuous and the Hamiltonian regular (i.e. for ﬁxed state and
costate the value of the control is unique), cp. Grass et al. (2008).
Having no state constraints, the ﬁrst condition is clearly fulﬁlled,
and because of our linear quadratic setting the latter is also satis-
ﬁed. Note that solution paths are in general not differentiable at
points where control constraints become active.
To calculate the interior steady state x^ we observe that
_x ¼ u dx ¼ 0) u^ ¼ dx^;
which can be substituted into (3) to obtain
ðr þ dÞdx^ ðr þ 2dÞax^þ Gx^ ðr þ dÞbþ C ¼ 0;
u^
d
¼ x^ ¼ C  ðr þ dÞbðr þ 2dÞa dðr þ dÞ  G :
We ﬁnd that this steady state is only admissible iff
b 6 C=ðr þ dÞ and ð5Þ
aP
dðr þ dÞ
r þ 2d þ
G
r þ 2dþ
d½C  ðr þ dÞb
r þ 2d ;
or
bP C=ðr þ dÞ and ð6Þ
a 6 dðr þ dÞ
r þ 2d þ
G
r þ 2dþ
d½C  ðr þ dÞb




G ðr þ 2dÞa r þ d
 
¼ dðr þ dÞ þ ðr þ 2dÞa G:
We have instability iff
a >
dðr þ dÞ þ G
r þ 2d :
Comparing this expression with (4), we ﬁnd that instability occurs if
and only if the _u ¼ 0-isocline is steeper than the _x ¼ 0-isocline.
Remark 1. This threshold is independent of the parameter b. The
linear term in the cost function has therefore no inﬂuence on the
stability of a steady state, although-of course-it does inﬂuence the
steady state’s location (and existence in the relevant region). h
The eigenvalues are
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p
and
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p
:We have an unstable node if
dðr þ dÞ
r þ 2d þ
G




r þ 2d ; ð7Þ





r þ 2d : ð8Þ
By using the Lagrangian function
L ¼ H þ m1uþ m2ð1 uÞ;
where the Lagrange multipliers m1, m2 can be determined to be
m1 ¼ ax b k and
m2 ¼ axþ bþ k 1;
we can ﬁnd the following steady states with active control
constraints
x^0 ¼ 0; u^0 ¼ 0; k^0 ¼  Cr þ d ; m^01 ¼ bþ
C
r þ d ; m^02
¼ 0 and ð9Þ
x^1 ¼ 1d ; u^1 ¼ 1; k^1 ¼
a C  G=d
r þ d ; m^11 ¼ 0; ð10Þ
m^12 ¼ ad þ b 1þ
a C  G=d
r þ d
The ﬁrst of the two steady states is admissible if m^01 > 0 and the sec-
ond if m^12 > 0. Both are stable saddle points as the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian are (d, r + d).
3.2. Characterization of solution
The qualitative structure of the solution can be completely
characterized by the levels of parameters a and b, distinguishing
two ranges for a and two for b. Parameter a does not appear in
the threshold for b. Hence, the full characterization essentially re-
duces to a simple 2  2 table, as indicated in Table 1, although the
lower left hand cell is itself divided to distinguish intermediate
from high values of a.
Using (5) and (6) we are able to distinguish regions where the
interior steady state is admissible. Furthermore, (7) and (8) provide
conditions concerning the stability properties of this steady state.
By considering (9) and (10) we can check the admissibility of the
boundary steady states.
Recall the interpretation of these two parameters:
a is the potential for a corrupt political leader to proﬁt from petty
bribes collected by the bureaucracy and
b denotes the direct net beneﬁt to the leader of being corrupt,
meaning the beneﬁt of bribes paid directly to the leader, less
associated enforcement risk.
For the numerical calculations we use the parameter values
r = 0.1, d = 0.2, C = 1, and G = 1 and vary parameters a and b.
We omit the picture for the upper left condition (small a, small
b), where corruption essentially does not pay off. We note only that
if the bureaucracy starts out sufﬁciently corrupt (x very large), the
leader may initially pursue some corrupt activities (u is initially
positive), but that occurs only in the transient; neither the leader
nor the bureaucracy is corrupt in steady state.
Fig. 1 shows the solution for the case where the leader does not
proﬁt much from a corrupt bureaucracy, but where the direct ben-
eﬁt from being corrupt is large (small a (=2.1), large b (=3.4)). Then
a saddle point solution arises so that the dynamics are simple. For
Table 1
Qualitative behavior of solution depending on parameters a and b.
b, Direct net effect of leader’s corruption on leader’s welfare
Low b, b < C/(r + d) High b, b > C/(r + d)
a, Potential for leader to exploit
bureaucracy’s corruption
Low a, a < dðrþdÞrþ2d þ Grþ2dþ d½CðrþdÞbrþ2d No corruption in steady state Stable saddle, see Fig. 1
Intermediate a,
dðrþdÞ
rþ2d þ Grþ2dþ d½CðrþdÞbrþ2d < a < rþ2d4 þ Grþ2d
3 Admissible steady states: interior steady state is
unstable node, see Fig. 3
Maximal corruption in steady
state, see Fig. 4
High a; a > rþ2d4 þ Grþ2d 3 Admissible steady states: interior steady state is
unstable focus, see Fig. 2
Fig. 1. Low potential to exploit bureaucracy’s corruption, but leader’s own
corruption is proﬁtable: saddle point equilibrium; (small a (=2.1), large b (=3.4);
r = 0.1, d = 0.2, C = 1, G = 1).
Fig. 2. Medium potential to exploit bureaucracy’s corruption and lower beneﬁts
from own corruption: interior unstable focus with Skiba point at x; (large a (=2.18),
small b (=3); r = 0.1, d = 0.2, C = 1, G = 1).
Fig. 3. Medium potential to exploit bureaucracy’s corruption but lower beneﬁts
from own corruption: interior unstable node and (weak) Skiba point coinciding
with the steady state; (intermediate a (=2.122), small b (=3.32); r = 0.1, d = 0.2, C = 1,
G = 1).
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mizes direct considerations (net beneﬁt of personal corruption, b,
relative to costs C and G). The bureaucracy then imitates that level
of corruption (x converges to the level indicated by the leader’s u).
There is some feedback. If the bureaucracy starts out honest, that
softens the leader’s initial degree of corruption, so u as well as x in-
crease over time.
Fig. 2, where a (=2.18) is large and b (=3) is small, has a history
dependent solution. For initial values of x just to the left or right of
the point x, the leader employs a level of corruption that is low or
high, respectively, and the system approaches the low or maxi-
mum steady state, respectively. In this sense, Fig. 2 is a typical
Skiba threshold solution with x being the Skiba point (also known
as DNSS or indifference-threshold point in related literature; see
Grass et al., 2008, but also Feichtinger et al., 2002; Caulkins et al.,
2010). If one starts exactly on the Skiba point, one is indifferent
between pursuing a policy that moves toward the lower or upper
equilibrium. Note, however, that the admissibility of the three
steady states does not automatically mean that a Skiba point
occurs for every parameter combination within the lower left case
of Table 1. Depending on the parameters, it may always be optimal
to go to one steady state or the other.
In Fig. 3 (intermediate a (=2.122) and small b (=3.32)) the
(weak) Skiba point coincides with the middle steady state. In that
case, the policy function is continuous, and the optimal policy
when starting exactly at that point is technically to remain there
forever. However, if there were the slightest perturbation to either
side, it would be optimal to diverge in that direction as far as pos-
sible, not to return to the steady state. We conclude that the
bureaucracy’s initial state drives the leader’s behavior-unless the
initial level of bureaucratic corruption is exactly at the Skiba point.The location of the Skiba point depends in expected ways on the
parameters. Larger beneﬁts of corruption (i.e., larger a and b) and/
or smaller costs (i.e., smaller C and G) push the Skiba point to the
left, meaning that for a broader range of initial conditions it is opti-
mal for the leader to pull the society even further into corruption.
Fig. 4. High potential to exploit bureaucracy’s corruption and leader’s own
corruption is proﬁtable: no interior steady state and maximum corruption; (large
a (=2.18), large b (=3.4); r = 0.1, d = 0.2, C = 1, G = 1).
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directly to the leader’s own corruption; it is the political price the
leader pays for presiding over a corrupt bureaucracy. If the public
can hold the political leader accountable for the bureaucracy’s
actions (high C), that reduces the leader’s incentives for being
corrupt, even if the public never detects or suffers from the
high-level corruption the leader engages directly in. So within this
model, one might expect democracies to be less corrupt than
dictatorships.
Fig. 4 shows an example of a solution for large a (=2.18) and
large b (=3.4) where for all initial conditions it is optimal for the
leader to be so corrupt that the system converges to a very high le-
vel of corruption. The difference between Figs. 4 and 2 or Fig. 3’s
state dependence stems from the relative magnitude of b and
C/(r + d). The roles of b and C are clear. Higher beneﬁts (b) or
smaller costs (C) of corruption favor greater corruption. It is also
not surprising that leaders who are more short-sighted (higher r)
would be more tempted by corruption.
It is more surprising that a higher d favors greater corruption
inasmuch as d is the natural rate of desistance from corruption
among the bureaucracy (outﬂow rate from x). When x decays
quickly, so does the leader’s contribution u to the corruption with-
in the bureaucracy. Thus, the leader can get away with a high level
of corruption without being punished as much or as long (via the
cost term Cx in the objective).
The striking implication of this observation is that when a soci-
ety is corrupt at least in part because of synergistic interaction be-
tween corruption of the political leader and bureaucracy,
reforming the bureaucracy may not be an effective reform strategy.
Clearing out corrupt bureaucrats (increasing d) may actually rein-
force the strength of the high-corruption equilibrium. However,
punishing the political leader for the bureaucracy’s corruption
(increasing C) or directly attacking the political leader’s corruption
(reducing b) could help.4. Discussion
We considered a corruption model inspired by, but distinct
from, Schelling’s (1978) classic model. In our model the only opti-
mizing decision maker is the senior political leader, and that leader
receives two distinct types of beneﬁts from corruption, that which
depends directly and only on his or her own actions and thosewhich are creamed from a bureaucracy that in turn collects bribes
from the populace. Likewise, the leader suffers (convex) costs from
both his or her own corruption and from the degree of corruption
in the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats’ decisions are not modeled
explicitly; they take their cues from the senior leadership, adjust-
ing the level of corruption over time to conform to the leader’s
example.
Structurally, four types of solutions are possible: (1) No corrup-
tion, (2) Maximum corruption, (3) An intermediate amount of cor-
ruption, and (4) Path dependency involving a Skiba point,
reminiscent of the original Schelling (1978) model.
Path dependency occurs only when there is a synergistic inter-
action between the degree of corruption of the leader and that of
the bureaucracy, such as when the leader extracts a share of the
bribes collected by the corrupt bureaucracy. Path dependency,
when it exists, takes the following form. If the level of corruption
in the bureaucracy is initially below this critical level, then it is
optimal for the leader to be relatively clean, and corruption will
ebb toward zero. The decision maker may not be entirely honest;
he or she might initially extract some bribes while the overall cul-
ture of corruption is still relatively high, but both the leader and
bureaucracy become less corrupt over time, with the leader ceas-
ing corrupt activity before the bureaucracy does. On the other
hand, if initially the bureaucracy’s level of corruption exceeds this
Skiba threshold, then it is in the leader’s self-interest to exploit the
resulting income-generating possibility by also being corrupt, with
the result that both the leader and the bureaucracy will become
increasingly corrupt over time.
Schelling’s model illustrated micro-motives and macrobehavior,
in which the collective action of many small decision makers fed
back on those decision makers’ private incentives. Schelling’s deci-
sion makers were too small to inﬂuence the system individually,
but if all such actors marched in lock step they could shape system
behavior.
Here, in contrast, we model an ‘‘important’’ decision maker
whose individual actions alone are sufﬁcient to have macroeffects.
Those effects feed back on the decision maker’s incentives. The re-
sult is threshold behavior and path dependency that would look
from the outside very much like Schelling’s model in its ability to
explain great heterogeneity in corruption levels across societies
at a given point of time, and persistence over time of both the low-
er-and higher-levels of corruption.
For any given leader, the policy conclusions are similar to those
of Schelling’s model. A society stuck in the high-corruption equilib-
rium will stay there unless and until there is some powerful
change that pushes the system up and over the tipping point and
down the other side. However, our model does not involve
‘‘enforcement swamping’’ (Kleiman, 1993, 2009), so the magnitude
of the required surge may be less extreme.
Our model also admits a story of individual reformers. Suppose
a reform minded individual wins political leadership, meaning
someone for whom the private gains of corruption are not appeal-
ing (a and b small). If that person remains in power long enough for
the bureaucracy’s corruption to fall below the tipping point, then
subsequent administrations may be corruption-free even if they
are led by people of average ethical character. Conversely, one par-
ticularly venal leader could, if in power long enough, have such a
bad effect on an originally clean bureaucracy as to make high-
levels of corruption a stable ﬁxture of that society at least until
an extraordinary reformer came on the scene.
So in some respects our model is slightly less pessimistic than
Schelling’s (1978) model regarding the prospects for pulling a cor-
rupt society back to a low-corruption steady state. It does warn,
though, that if the political leader sets the tone for the bureau-
cracy’s level of corruption, then even if the bureaucracy’s corrup-
tion synergistically enhances the leader’s rewards from being
546 J.P. Caulkins et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 225 (2013) 541–546corrupt, ‘‘draining the swamp’’ by expelling corrupt bureaucrats
may not be effective. When corruption ﬂows from the top, the re-
forms may need to target the top leadership.
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